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TAX OF EDUCATIONAL GRANTS
Only the failure of state law enforcement bodies to observe federal
constitutional principles and the lack of faith in state court implementa-
tion of those principles are responsible for the continuing trend toward
federal intervention in civil rights cases such as Wheeler. State enforce-
ment agencies should be better trained and better supervised to prevent
systematic unconstitutional police harassment. State courts and prose-
cutors both should be careful that procedural devices, such as the nolle
prosequi with leave, are not abused where there is a lack of evidence or a
desire to avoid a constitutional question. The proper forum for matters
of state criminal law enforcement and state criminal statutory interpre-
tation is in the state courts rather than in the federal district courts. But
the principles of Dombrowski can be held to their narrowest construction
by the federal courts only if the states through their law enforcement and
judicial institutions provide adequate safeguards against the deprivation
of constitutional rights.
NORMAN E. SMITH
Income Tax-Tests under Section 117 for Exclusion of
Educational Grants
Section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the exclusion
from gross income of amounts received as scholarships or fellowships.'
Prior to its enactment there was no specific statutory provision covering
educational stipends. Instead, the inquiry was "[w]hether such grants
. ..fell within the broad provision excluding from income amounts re-
significant deterrent to effective police action. For a discussion of possible limita-
tions on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions and the policy considerations behind such
limitations, see Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in tie Wake of Monroe
v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1486 (1969).
1 The section reads in part:
§ 117. Scholarships and fellowship grants.
(a) General rule-In the case of an individual, gross income does not in
clude-
(1) any amount received-
(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined in
section 151(e) (4)), or
(B) as a fellowship grant,
including the value of contributed services and accommodations; and(2) any amount received to cover expenses for-
(A) travel,
(B) research,
(C) clerical help, or
(D) equipment,
which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but
only to the extent that the amount is so expended by the recipient.
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ceived as 'gifts.' 2 The intent of Congress in passing section 117 was
to exclude scholarships and fellowships as a separate category of income,
thereby avoiding the artificial income-gift distinction.' In doing so, Con-
gress evidently hoped to prevent inconsistent ad hoc court determinations
of qualifying stipends.
The Treasury Department has provided guidelines for application of
the statute in a regulation defining a scholarship as ".... an amount paid
or allowed to, or for the benefit of, a student, whether an undergraduate
or a graduate, to aid such individual in pursuing his studies."'4 In addi-
tion to satisfying this definition, the income in question must not fall
within either of two categories established in section 1.117-4(c) of the
Treasury Regulations. First, the exclusion is denied for any amount
paid to enable an individual ". . . to pursue studies or research, if such
amount represents either compensation for past, present, or future em-
ployment services or represents payment for services which are subject
to the direction or supervision of the grantor."' An employment rela-
tionship between the scholar and his sponsor usually is sufficient to place
the income within this category. Second, the stipend is taxed if the
recipient pursues ". . . studies or research primarily for the benefit of
the grantor."' The "primary purpose" test has been developed to de-
termine whether the grant is covered by this language. In Bingler v.
Johnsonj the Supreme Court had its first occasion to apply section 117
and to rule on the validity of the tests furnished by section 1.117-4(c)
of the Treasury Regulations. In Johnson, a corporation offered a pro-
gram in which employees were granted time from work to complete the
course of study for a doctorate in a field related to the employee's work
with the company. To qualify for the program, an employee was required
to sign a contract obligating himself to work for the company for two
years after he received his doctorate. When the course work had been
=Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 752 (1969) (footnote omitted). See, e.g.,
George W. Stone, 23 T.C. 254 (1954).
'H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1954).
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3 (a) (1956). A fellowship is an amount "... paid or
allowed to, or for the benefit of, an individual to aid him in the pursuit of study
or research." Id. § 1.117-3(c).
'Id. § 1.117-4(c) (1).
'Id. § 1.117-4(c) (2).
'394 U.S. 741 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissented on the grounds of the circuit
court holding). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had held that the
amounts received under the program were excludable. Johnson v. Bingler, 396
F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1968). In reaching its decision that court held Treasury Regu-
lation section 1.117-4(c) invalid as being contrary to congressional intent and an
improper reading of section 117. Id.
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completed, the employee was granted an educational leave in order to
write his doctoral dissertation, the subject of which required company
approval. The employee received tuition expenses, a stipend based on his
current salary and number of dependents, and retained such employee
benefits as seniority.
The question presented to the Court was whether a stipend paid
under such an educational leave program constituted a "scholarship"
excludable from income under section 117. The Court held that the
amounts received under the program could not be excluded because they
failed to pass the employment relationship test. In upholding section
1.117-4(c) of the Treasury Regulations, the Court approved the tech-
nique that had been used by the lower courts and the Treasury Depart-
ment-application of the "primary purpose" test and the employment
relationship test to decide each case on its particular facts without estab-
lishing more definite standards.
Except where part-time work is required, scholarships or fellowships
have generally fallen within section 117 without having to survive such
tests. But the tests have been applied to stipends paid degree candidates
when more than mere class attendance is expected of them. The Code pro-
vides for the taxation of money received for ". . . teaching, research, or
any services in the nature of part-time employment. ."' even if the work
is mandatory for scholarship recipients. If the work is required of all
candidates for that degree, however, the pay is excludable.'
This rather straightforward provision has been inconsistently inter-
preted by the Treasury and the courts. For instance, the exclusion was
allowed nursing students who worked in a hospital and received room
and board;1" a doctoral candidate in psychology required to work part-
time at a Veterans Administration hospital;" students of medical tech-
nology doing laboratory work ;12 students attending a college that de-
manded work of every student ;1' a student conducting research in physics
where it was required of all candidates ;14 and to students receiving funds
BINT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 117(b) (1).
'Id. See, e.g., Chandler P. Bahalla, 35 T.C. 13 (1960).
"
0Rev. Rul. 338, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 54.
"William Wells, 40 T.C. 40 (1963). The Tax Court reasoned that the pri-
mary purpose of the program was to train students. Id. at 48. Accord, Rev. Rul. 59,
1965-1 CUm. BULL. 67, suspending Rev. Rul. 118, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 41.
"Rev. Rul. 29, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 79.
"' Rev. Rul. 54, 1964-1 Cum. BuLL. 81. The work here was termed an "in-
tegral part of [an] overall scholastic program."
14 Rev. Rul. 250, 1963-2 CUm. BULL. 79, acquiescing in Chandler P. Bahalla, 35
T.C. 13 (1960).
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under the War Orphans Educational Assistance Act of 1956." On the
other hand, the exclusion was denied to a state welfare worker who re-
ceived a grant and leave of absence to work on her master's degree;16
to seminary students required to be assistant pastors for a year with
pay;17 and to an education student required to be an "intern teacher"
in order to receive her master's degree.1 8
Some categories have not been explored by the courts or by the
Treasury Department. For example, services are expected of the college
athlete who wishes .to remain eligible for his scholarship, but whether
required participation in varsity sports should be considered "part-time
employment" is an open question. The answer might well depend upon
whether the main purpose of the athletic scholarship program is to edu-
cate the student or have a winning season.
Scholarship or fellowship holders who do not seek a degree have
given rise to most of the problems under section 117. Grants to such
students are excludable only if the grantor is a tax-exempt organization,
a domestic or foreign government, or one of certain international organi-
zations ;1 the exclusion is limited to three-hundred dollars a month for a
maximum of thirty-six months.20 It is in this area that the primary pur-
pose test and the employment relationship test have been most extensively
used. The courts have been obliged to examine the connection between the
scholar and his benefactor in applying these tests. If an employment rela-
tionship appears to exist, the income is generally taxed either as "compen-
sation" or on the theory that it is primarily for the grantor's benefit and
not for the recipient's education.2'
There can be no doubt that in deciding cases where the taxpayer was
not working toward a degree, the Treasury Department's rulings have
seemed inconsistent. For example, an individual given funds for pure re-
search by a qualifying grantor who did not exercise any control has been
"
6Rev. Rul. 68-415, 1968 INT. REv. BULL. No. 32, at 9, acquiescing in Mary
Keegstra, 48 T.C. 897 (1967), and revoking Rev. Rul. 355, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 53.
1" Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966).
"'Rev. Rul. 522, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 50.
18 Elmer L. Reese, 45 T.C. 407, aff'd per curiant, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967).
Accord, Rev. Rul. 443, 1967-2 Cum. BULL. 75.
"6 INT. RE V. CODE of 1954, §§ 117 (b) (2) (A) (i)-(iv).
"°Id. § 117(b) (2) (B).
2' Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966) ; Woodail v. Commis-
sioner, 321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963); Ussery v. United States, 296 F.2d 582
(5th Cir. 1961); Stephen L. Zolnay, 49 T.C. 389 (1968); Elmer L. Reese, 45
T.C. 407 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967); Alex L. Sweet,
40 T.C. 403 (1963); Ethel M. Bonn, 34 T.C. 64 (1960); Frank Thomas Bach-
mura, 32 T.C. 1117 (1959).
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held to be an "independent contractor" and not allowed to exclude the
income under section 117.22 But an alien who conducted research for a
year under a grant from his government and who performed no services
either for his grantor or for the institute where he worked was not taxed
on the grant.
23
The importance of the employment relationship was demonstrated
in Revenue Ruling 58-222.24 A college teacher was given a leave of ab-
sence to work on a project over which the college had no control. His
expenses were paid in part by the college and in part by a private founda-
tion that donated enough to make the sum equal his former salary. The
Treasury Department held that the grant from the college was taxable as
"compensation" even though the college was under no obligation to give
either the grant or the leave of absence. However, the ruling permitted
exclusion from gross income of the amount provided by the foundation.
As for medical interns and residents, application of the employment rela-
tionship test has generally led to the taxation of their income.25
The primary purpose test and the employment relationship test ob-
viously are conducive to inconsistent holdings on similar facts and there-
fore frustrate congressional purpose. The Supreme Court in deciding
Johnson should not have endorsed these tests by sanctioning the regula-
tion2" that gave birth to them. Instead, the Court should have provided
some new solutions.
It has been suggested that the primary purpose test not be applied
at all in situations where every candidate for a particular degree does
"Rev. Rul. 127, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 275. Contra, Rev. Rul. 130, 1960-1
Cum. BULL. 46, holding on similar facts that amounts received were excludable.
"Rev. Rul. 292, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 280.
2 Rev. Rul. 222, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 54.
'
5Woodail v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963); Quast v. United
States, 293 F. Supp. 56 (D. Minn. 1968); Ethel M. Bonn, 34 T.C. 64 (1960);
Rev. Rul. 68-520, 1968 INT. REv. BULL. No. 41, at 8; Rev. Rul. 117, 1965-1 Cum.
BULL. 67. Three recent cases indicate, however, that residents may, in some
situations, exclude their salaries. Pappas v. United States, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
84,029 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (jury to determine whether payments made to plaintiff
"were made primarily for the purpose of furthering his education and training
in his individual capacity."); Anderson v. United States, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
79,305 (D. Minn. 1960) (jurors instructed that if they found that the grant was
primarily for the taxpayer's education, that residents at other hospitals performed
the same work, and that the payments were not for past, present, or future services,
they could find for plaintiff); Wrobleski v. Bingler, 161 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Pa.
1958) (plaintiff found primarily engaged in education for his own benefit). But
c.f. Quast v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 56 (D. Minn. 1968).
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c).
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the same work and receives pay for it.27 One court has stated that it will
look to the amount of a grant to a candidate for a degree as a factor in
determining whether it is compensation or a protected scholarship 28 al-
though the statute itself provides no dollar maximum. With respect to
interns and residents, one writer argues that since "[b]oth the interns
and residents and their employer expect the employment relationship
to end upon completion of the training... ," they should be treated
differently under section 117 than they generally are at present. He
furnishes what is perhaps a more workable approach to the employment
test:
Since Congress was concerned with the employment relationship
where a non-degree candidate is an employee, Section 117 should
be read in a way that denies the exclusion only where payment is
made by an employer for employment activities that are designed to
advance the business.30
Perhaps the best answer would be for Congress to discard section 117
and substitute a new statute excluding from gross income the expenses
of tuition, books, fees, and a fixed living allowance. The distinction be-
tween degree candidates and those not seeking a degree should be
abolished under this approach. Alternatively, the Code could be amended
to allow a deduction from ordinary income of the costs of higher educa-
tion. The Treasury, on the other hand, might provide a solution by pro-
viding a more definite test in its regulations such as allowing an ex-
clusion unless it is shown that an employee-employer relationship will
exist after the student has completed his studies. Past experience demon-
strates the need for a new approach. Whether either the Treasury De-
partment or Congress will provide it remains to be seen.
DONALD G. SPARROW
"'Tabac, Scholarship and Fellowship Grants: An Administrative Merry-Go-
Round, 46 TAXES 485 (1968).8 Stephen L. Zolnay, 49 T.C. 389, 398 (1968).
' Tabac, supra note 27, at 492.
Id. 493 (emphasis added). The distinction is between the business and the
educational activities of a particular grantor. If the employee is expected to use
his new learning for the grantor's future benefit, then the amount he receives
should be taxed. If the grant is supplied for purely philanthropic reasons, the
grant should be excludable.
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